The West and the Rest

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I   Introduction

The title proposed for this paper is provocative: it reminds one of a conference held in the Adlon Hotel on Unter der Linden in Berlin, shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, titled "Is West Best?" The organizers had assembled an interesting panel of European, South-East Asian and African speakers.[1]

Not surprisingly, the Europeans, while slightly discomforted by the implications of the question, asserted the intellectual and ethical superiority of "Western values," while acknowledging the short-comings of elements of that civilization; Professor Mazrui, whose family had been part of the Afro-Shirazi ruling class in East Africa for centuries and who had long held a professorship in New York, discussed the hybrid character of Africa's *triple heritage* – traditional African culture, Islamic culture, and that of the West[2]; while the Singaporean and Malaysian speakers were even more ambivalent. Ambassador Woon, representing Singapore in the Federal Republic of Germany at that time, suggested that he identified with the conservative Western values of the late-Victorian era in the United Kingdom, but found little to applaud in the "excessive personal liberalism, even approaching decadence" that had come to characterize "Western values" a century later.

1.   What is "the West"? Secular and Religious Origins of the "West" and the "East"

The "West", as the term is used today, usually refers to most of Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. (The inclusion of the last two is due entirely to their settlement by persons of British origin, and their incorporation into the British Empire, later the Commonwealth, and into ANZUS[3] after World War II.) The (partial) exclusion of Latin America, despite its geographical location, is due chiefly to its omission from "Western" military alliances assembled after the same war. The "West" is occasionally styled the "Occident" (Latin: "occidens"), as distinct from the "East" or "Orient" (Latin: oriens").

Conceptually, the distinction is based on the secular divide between the Western and Eastern Roman Empire, and later, the theological and clerical-hierarchical division between the Western (Roman Catholic) and Eastern (Orthodox) Christian churches. It acquired a further religious-cultural dimension after the rise of Islam and the projection of Muslim power across the Mediterranean and into central Europe. Over time, as it became apparent that the earth was largely spherical, and map projections came to represent that reality[4], with the Greenwich meridian representing 0° longitude, geographies further east of Europe – notably the Indian subcontinent, China, South-East Asia, the

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1   Dr. Hansjorg Elshorst, Managing Director of Transparency International; Professor Ali Mazrui, Director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies at the State University of New York; Dr. Noordin Sopiee, Head of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur; Dr. Eberhard von Koerber, Vice President of the Club of Rome and Deputy Chairman of the Wittenberg Centre for Global Ethics; and Professor Walter Woon, Ambassador of Singapore to the Federal Republic of Germany.

2   Mazrui, Ali. The Africans: A Triple Heritage. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Africans:_A_Triple_Heritage', see also https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4123444/, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

3   The Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty), 1951. Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State – https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/anzus, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

4   Early World Maps, Wikipedia – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_world_maps#:~:text=Anaximander%20(c.,-610%E2%80%93546%20BCE&text=546%20BCE)%20is%20credited%20with,Aegean%20Sea%20at%20the%20center, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

Korean peninsula and Japan – were incorporated into European (and North American) definitions of the "East."[5] Samuel Huntington followed this general geographical division in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Re-making of World Order*[6], in which he defined the Orthodox world and Latin America either as parts of the West, or as distinct civilizations intimately related to it.

2. The Emergence of the "West" and the "East"

The Roman Empire, at its height (c. 117 CE), was the most extensive political and social structure in Western civilization.

The Provinces of the Roman Empire under the Emperor Augustus (r. 27 BCE – 14 CE)

Legend:
- The Roman Republic, c. 63 BCE
- Conquest/campaigns of Julius Caesar
- Expansion until 44 BCE (assassination of Caesar)
- Conquests/acquisitions under Augustus, c. 14 CE
- Conquest incomplete, province lost in 9 CE

- **ITALIA** Non-provincial special status
- **Galatia** Senatorial provinces
- **Cilicia** Imperial provinces
- Roman client state

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By 285 CE, the Empire had grown too large to be ruled from Rome and was divided by Diocletian (r. 284–305 CE) into a Western and an Eastern Empire. The capital of the Western empire remained in Rome, while Nicomedia became that of the Eastern Empire. In 313 CE, the Roman Emperor Constantine ended the persecution of Christians, paving the way for Christianity to become the state religion of the Empire. In 324 CE, Constantine's army defeated the forces of Licinius, Emperor of the East. Having restored the unity of the Empire, and recognizing that Rome could no

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5   Commonly Used Map Projections, ISSM – https://www.icsm.gov.au/education/fundamentals-mapping/projections/commonly-used-map-projections#:~:text=One%20of%20the%20most%20famous,lines%20of%20constant%20true%20direction, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

6   Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996). Paperback with a new foreword by Zbigniew Brzezinski, August 2, 2011 – https://www.amazon.com/Clash-Civilizations-Remaking-World-Order/dp/1451628978, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

longer serve as the capital, being too far from the frontiers, Constantine identified Byzantium as the best location, close to the frontiers, easy to defend, and with access to the Danube and the Euphrates. He renamed it Constantinople, built it over six years on the model of Rome, with 14 districts and imperial public works, and consecrated it in 330 CE.

The Western and Eastern Roman Empire: 395CE – under the reign of Emperor Theodosius I.

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The citizens of the western Empire spoke Latin and were progressively incorporated into the (Roman) Catholic tradition. Those of the eastern Empire spoke Greek and worshipped under what emerged as the Eastern Orthodox branch of the Christian church. The city of Rome fell in 476 CE. The eastern Empire – later styled the Byzantine Empire – continued for several centuries with a unique Roman identity.[7]

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[7]   See The History of the Byzantine Empire (or East Roman Empire): An Animated Timeline Covering 1,100 Years of History. Open Culture, June 9, 2022 – https://www.openculture.com/2022/06/the-history-of-the-byzantine-empire-or-east-roman-empire.html, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

The Byzantine Empire

The *Great Schism of 1054* saw the division of Christianity into the Orthodox Church, led by Michael Cerularius, Patriarch of Constantinople, and the (Roman) Catholic Church, led by Pope Leo IX. The Roman Pope's claim to universal jurisdiction and authority was opposed by the prelates of the Orthodox Church, who agreed to honor the position and person of the Pope, but ruled that ecclesiastical matters should be decided by a Council of Bishops. This divide led to a permanent separation between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox family – the Eastern Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, and Russian Orthodox Churches. The two branches remained on friendly terms until Western knights of the Fourth Crusade captured Constantinople in 1204. To this day, the schism persists, defined by ecclesiastical, jurisdictional, cultural and theological[8] differences.[9]

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[8] See Theological differences between the Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church, Wikipedia – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theological_differences_between_the_Catholic_Church_and_the_Eastern_Orthodox_Church, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[9] In 1965, Pope Paul VI and Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras I nullified the anathemas of 1054, although this nullification was a goodwill gesture that did not constitute a reunion.

The Great Schism (1054): Catholic and Orthodox Churches

II   The Rise of Islam

The second factor that contributed significantly to the sense of "a West in opposition to an East" was the rise and spread of Islam, initially through military conquest, during the reign of the *Rashidun*, Muhammad's first four successors from 632 to 661 CE, the "rightly guided Caliphs" selected by the *umma*:[10] Disputes about Muslim secular and religious authority led to schisms between Sunni, Shia and Ibadi[11] groups due to disagreements about the succession of authority after the

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[10]   Abu Bakr (632–634 CE), Umar ibn al-Khattab (634–644 CE), Uthman ibn Affan (644-656 CE) and Ali Ibn Abi Talib (656–66 1CE).

[11]   The Ibadis emerged as a moderate school of the Kharijites, who originated from the Muhakkima (Arabic: محكمة) and al-Haruriyya (Arabic: الحرورية). The Muhakkima and al-Haruriyya were supporters of Ali in the first Muslim civil war who then abandoned the Shia cause after rejecting arbitration between Ali and Mu'awiya I at the Battle of Siffin in 657 CE. The Kharijites opposed both the Alids (Shia) and Umayyads, advocating for Islam to return to its form prior to the conflict between Ali and Mu'awiya I in the first Muslim civil war.

death of the Prophet. Sunnis believe that Abu Bakr, the father of Muhammad's wife Aisha, who was selected to succeed him by the Muslim *umma* on Muhammad's death, was the Prophet's rightful successor.[12]

Sunnis thus follow the four Rashidun, while Shias believe that Muhammad, acting on the command of Allah, declared his cousin and son-in-law Ali Ibn Abi Talib[13] the next Caliph, thus making him and his descendants the Prophet's successors.[14] Ali and his descendants by Fatimah – the Twelve Imams – are thus, in the Shia "Twelver" tradition, the legitimate Muslim leaders.[15]

The Sunni and Shia traditions were embedded in political structures: Sunni Islam in the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates in Damascus and Baghdad respectively, and Shia Islam, much later, in the Safavid dynasty[16] which ruled from 1501 to 1722, and 1729 to 1736, over modern Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Armenia, most of Georgia, the North Caucasus, Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan, and parts of Turkey, Syria, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.[17]

Over a few hundred years, Islam spread from the Arabian Peninsula to modern Spain in the west and northern India in the east. After subduing rebellions in the peninsula, Arab Muslim armies conquered territory in the Byzantine and Sasanian Persian empires and beyond, succeeding, within two decades, in creating a Muslim empire spanning three continents.

The Byzantine and Sasanian Empires had been weakened after wars with one another and with peripheral factions, and by economic turmoil, disease and a worsening environment. The Arab Muslim armies understood Byzantine and Sasanian military tactics, having served in both armies, and exploited them effectively during the reign of the second caliph, Umar, between 634 and 644 CE.

Significant conversion and cultural exchange did not occur under the *Rashidiun*, nor were complex political institutions developed. Only under the Umayyad Dynasty (661–750 CE) did Islamic and

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[12]   Sunnis believe that the Quran determines that leaders are to be chosen through the consensus of the umma.

[13]   Ali was the father of his grandsons Hasan ibn Ali and Hussein ibn Ali, by Fatimah, Muhammad's daughter by his wife Khadijah bint Khuwaylid.

[14]   Shias believe that Muhammad made this appointment clear in the Hadith of Ghadir Khumm (Arabic: غدير خم), an account of a speech by Muhammad on 18 Dhu al-Hijjah, 10 AH (March 15, 632 CE) at Ghadir Khumm, near al-Juhfah. The hadith is interpreted differently by Shias and Sunnis: The Shias maintain that in this hadith the prophet Muhammad appointed Ali as his heir and successor. The Sunnis recognize Muhammad's declaration about Ali at Ghadir Khumm but argue that he was simply urging the audience to hold his cousin and son-in-law in high esteem and affection. (Veccia Vaglieri, Laura, G͟hadīr K͟humm, Encyclopedia of Islam, 2012, Brill Online).

       The Imamate of the Shias encompasses a prophetic function, unlike the Caliphate of the Sunnis, which was focused on political stability. Unlike the Sunnis, the Shias believe special spiritual qualities were granted to Muhammad and to Ali Ibn Abi Talib and the Imams that succeeded them. Shias believe the Imams are immaculate from sin and human error (ma'sūm) and can understand and interpret the meaning of the teachings of Islam. They are thus trustees (wasi) who bear the light of Muhammad (Nūr Muhammadin).

[15]   Some 85 percent of Shias are "Twelvers." Twelver (Arabic: اثنا عشرية Ithnā'ashariyyah; Persian: شیعه دوازده امامی) Shia Islam or Imamiyyah (Arabic: إمامية) is the largest branch of Shia Islam. The term Twelver refers to adherents' belief in the Twelve Imams, and their belief that the last Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, lives in occultation and will reappear as the promised Mahdi. Twelvers constitute majorities in Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Bahrain; a plurality in Lebanon; and significant minorities in Kuwait, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia. Smaller minorities also exist in Oman, Yemen, Egypt and Uzbekistan.

[16]   Persian: صفویان The Safavids arose from the Safaviyya Sufi order in Ardabil in Azerbaijan.

[17]   When the dynasty fell in 1736, the Safavids had revived Persia as a major economic power with an efficient state, and spread Shia Islam throughout Iran, and large parts of the Caucasus, Anatolia and Mesopotamia.

Arabic culture became entrenched, while the Abbasid Dynasty solidified these changes between 750 and 1258 CE.

Before the Umayyads, Islamic rule was non-centralized, with the army commanded by a Muslim caliph, the religious and political successor of the prophet Muhammad. The early caliphate had strong armies and garrison towns, but no sophisticated administration. It kept existing governments intact and used its governors to collect taxes.

As the empire grew, the Umayyads, having shifted their capital from Mecca to Damascus, developed robust state structures, drawing on those of the Byzantines and Sasanians to create a centralized, dynastic political state, and adopting a monarchical government. They replaced Greek, Persian and Coptic with Arabic as the chief administrative language and reinforced an Islamic identity, with an Arab hierarchy, with non-Arabs being accorded secondary status. The Umayyads minted Islamic coins and developed a sophisticated bureaucracy, in which governors (viziers) controlled smaller political units. The Umayyads did not actively encourage conversion, however, and most subjects were non-Muslim and required to pay a tax, enabling the Umayyads to subsidize further expansion.


The Umayyad Caliphate in 750 CE

Age of the Caliphs
- Expansion under Muhammad, 622-632
- Expansion during the Rashidun Caliphate, 632-661
- Expansion during the Umayyad Caliphate, 661-750

Shows modern borders.

Some factions regarded the Umayyads as corrupt and illegitimate, and rallied around new leaders, claiming legitimacy through lineage with the prophet Muhammad, through his uncle Abbas, revolting against the Umayyads, and bringing the Abbasid caliphate to power. Although the Abbasids distinguished themselves from their Umayyad predecessors, leadership was also dynastic and centralized. They changed the social hierarchy with a more inclusive government in a cosmopolitan capital, Baghdad, leading Persian culture to have a greater influence on the Abbasid court.

The Abbasid Caliphate

The Expansion of Islam under the Ottomans, Safavids and the Mughals

After the fall of the Abbasids in Baghdad to a Mongol invasion, the Ottomans claimed the Caliphate. In 1453, after Mehmed's conquest, the Ottoman seat moved to Constantinople. In 1517, Sultan

Selim I incorporated the Mamluk Sultanate, becoming defender of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. Although the Ottomans were viewed as the representatives of the Sunni world, their Sultans did not use the title "Caliph" until the Empire declined. Then, until the formal abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 after Turkey's defeat in World War I, the Sultans used the title to raise their prestige among Sunni Muslims.

Territories in Central Europe under the Ottoman Empire (1682-85)

Central Europe in 1683 during the short-term existence of Imre Thököly's Principality of Upper Hungary

- Habsburg Monarchy
  - Habsburg Kingdom of Hungary (Royal Hungary)
  - Croatia
  - Other Habsburg possessions
- Ottoman Empire
  - Ottoman eyalets
  - Ottoman vassal states

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1. The Role of Muslim-Christian Tensions in Sparking World War I

As the Ottomans expanded their reach into eastern and central Europe, they clashed with the Russian and Holy Roman Empires over four centuries, besieging Vienna in 1529[18] and, at the request of Hungarian Calvinist leader Imre Thököly, again in 1683.[19] Although they were defeated in both assaults, boundaries shifted continuously. The Balkan Wars in 1912-13, which led to the First World War, were triggered by disorder in Macedonia spreading to Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 brought a government to power in Constantinople (by then Istanbul) that was committed to reform, but insisted on centralized control and refused to make concessions

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[18]   Siege of Vienna 1529, Encyclopaedia Britannica – https://www.britannica.com/event/Siege-of-Vienna-1529, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[19]   Siege of Vienna 1683, Encyclopaedia Britannica – https://www.britannica.com/event/Siege-of-Vienna-1683, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

to the Christian nationalities of Macedonia, which included Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and Vlachs. The Albanians also resented the Young Turks' centralist policy.

A *Macedonian Revolutionary Organization* (IMRO) organized to resist the Turkish administration. Clashes roused public opinion in Bulgaria and in Serbia, where the Narodna Odbrana ("National Defense") was infiltrated by the "Black Hand," which organized resistance in Serbia and Macedonia. Bulgarians' activity in Macedonia led to the formation of an armed band to defend Greek interests, but the Greek government was more interested in extending its territory in the Aegean Islands and Crete. From 1911, Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians united against the Turks, however, in a common campaign for freedom.

In October 1908, Austria-Hungary had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, still legally part of the Ottoman Empire but under Austro-Hungarian administration since the Congress of Berlin (1878). Vienna also had a treaty right to occupy Novi Pazar, which separated Montenegro from Serbia. Although resentful of Vienna's action, which precluded a union of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbia, the Serbian government avoided confrontation with Austro-Hungary, focusing instead on Macedonia, where Turkey could be attacked in alliance with Bulgaria. The Agadir Incident[20] of 1911 revealed that the *Triple Alliance* (Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy) and the *Triple Entente* (France, Great Britain and Russia) were evenly balanced, giving small powers the ability to take initiatives.

The 1st Balkan War was fought between the Balkan League – Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro – and the Ottoman Empire, and saw the defeat of the Turks. The 2nd Balkan War arose from disagreements between Bulgaria and the triad of Serbia, Greece and Romania over the division of their conquests in Macedonia. After minor battles, and Turkey's re-entry against Bulgaria, the combatants signed a peace treaty on August 10, 1913, permitting Greece and Serbia to divide most of Macedonia between them,

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[20]   Agadir Incident, Encyclopedia Britannica – https://www.britannica.com/event/Agadir-Incident, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

The Balkan Wars

Turkey and Austria-Hungary were both weakened. Due to the partitioning of Novi Pazar between Serbia and Montenegro, Austria-Hungary could not intervene militarily in the Balkans in the crisis of June–July 1914, making Vienna's ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, 1914 seem like naked aggression. The Balkan wars had also altered the alliance structure in the Balkans. Bulgaria looked to Austria-Hungary for support, while Romania moved towards the Triple Entente. The Turks appointed German General Otto Liman von Sanders to strengthen their forces.[21]

The rise in tensions between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which had extensive claims on Albanian territory and enjoyed German support, led to Austria-Hungary delivering an ultimatum on October 17, 1913 to compel Serbia to withdraw from the Albanian borderlands. The Southern Slav question surged to the fore with the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serb member of the "Black Hand" on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo, setting in process the events that led to World War I.[22]

Even before this, however, since the Western European Enlightenment, the concept of "the West" was forged progressively in opposition to concepts of "Russia," "the East," "the Orient," "Eastern barbarism" and "Oriental despotism." Transformed into a socio-political concept after the Industrial Revolution, it was rendered increasingly as a symbol of progress and modernity (ein Zukunftsbegriff). As the United States rose in power and the telegraph and modern shipping compressed the distance across the Atlantic, the US came to feature more prominently in conceptualizations of the "West." By the middle of the 20th century, "Western" culture had become closely associated with

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[21] Balkan Wars, Encyclopaedia Britannica – https://www.britannica.com/topic/Balkan-Wars, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[22] Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, Penguin (2012).

the popular culture of the US, disseminated worldwide through radio, television, recorded music and films.

2. Competition and Contestation within the "West"

It would be naïve and ahistorical to suggest that the propensity to employ unilateral military force, or intimidation through threat to advance national interests, is, or has been, an exclusive feature of "Western" foreign policy. It was a central instrument of statecraft in all the great civilizations for millennia[23] and the "military instrument" is one of four instruments of national foreign policy – together with diplomacy, international public communication (or propaganda), and economic incentives and sanctions – widely recognized as a means of advancing national interests, notably by theorists and practitioners of the *realist* school[24] of international relations.[25]

That said, western European states and empires had waged dynastic and religious wars against one another for centuries before the collapse of the USSR in 1991, as well as limited wars for economic advantage. From the 15th century, moreover, Spain waged wars of conquest in Latin America, while the Portuguese wrested commercial supremacy from the Arabs in the Indian Ocean by force, consolidating control of most commercial traffic between Europe and Asia from permanent bases in Cochin and Goa, allowing Lisbon to monopolize Indian Ocean trade. In 1642, the Dutch drove the Portuguese out of the west African Gold Coast, the source of most Portuguese slave labor, leaving this rich slaving area to the Dutch and the English.

The Dutch, French and English made increasing inroads into Asia as Portuguese trade in the Indian Ocean declined, with the Dutch only losing control of the East Indies to the Japanese during World War II, and the British granting independence to India only in 1947. French dominance had declined after the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, and Paris refocused on North and West Africa, its *pré carré Africain*[26] in the 20th century, retaining only island territories beyond that, in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean.

In the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, European powers also began a "scramble for Africa" to secure additional resources to feed newly-constructed industrial capacity. To avoid unnecessary confrontations, as the continent was large enough to meet the needs of all, the major powers negotiated and formalized their respective claims to African territory, mindless of the indigenous populations, at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885.[27]

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[23] For military action outside of the "West", see List of conflicts in Asia – https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/List_of_conflicts_in_Asia, and List of modern conflicts in the Middle East – https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[24] Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Raymond Aro, and George Kennan are thought of as exponents of classical realism; Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and Barry Buzan as liberal realists; and Robert J. Art, Robert Gilpin, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt as neorealists/structural realists.

[25] See e.g. Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1948); Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985).

[26] La redéfinition des secteurs d'intervention, visant à faire disparaître la notion très néocoloniale de pays « du champ », l'ancien pré carré africain dit « francophone », a eu pour effet de disperser l'aide dans une soixantaine de pays sur trois continents. (Philippe Leymarie. Malaise dans la coopération entre la France et l'Afrique. In : Le Monde diplomatique, June 2002.)

[27] Berlin Conference of 1884 – 1885, Encyclopaedia of Africa, Oxford Reference – https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-9780195337709-e-0467, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

The United States stood apart from most European contestations. After the *War of Independence* from 1775-83, the US adopted a policy of neutrality in European conflicts, notably between England and France, in the Neutrality Act of 1794. After 1780, the US opened relations with North African states, and with the Ottoman Empire. In his Farewell Message in 1796, moreover, President Washington counselled against foreign entanglements:

> "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote, relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations & collisions of her friendships, or enmities. Our detached & distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course."

The *Louisiana Purchase* of 1803, concluded by President Jefferson with Napoleon Bonaparte, doubled the size of the United States, adding a huge swath west of the Mississippi River, opening up millions of new farm sites for the yeomen farmers who underpinned Jeffersonian Democracy. Despite the *Embargo Act* of 1807 formally forbidding trade with both France and Britain, the British shut down most American trade with France, leading the US to declare war on Britain in 1812. A series of military fiascos ended with the *Treaty of Ghent* in 1815.

In response to the independence of Spanish colonies in Latin America in 1821, the US, with the agreement of the United Kingdom, promulgated the *Monroe Doctrine* in 1823, providing that the United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of European states or in wars between them; and that while the US would recognize existing European colonies and dependencies in the Western Hemisphere, no further colonization was permitted in that hemisphere, and the US would view any attempt by a European power to oppress or control any nation there as a hostile act against the United States.[28]

US intervention against other polities began with a war with Mexico over Texas in 1846. Under the *Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo* in 1848 the US acquired California, Arizona, and New Mexico, with the Hispanic residents of those territories receiving US citizenship. Subsequent attacks on and displacement of sovereign tribal nations followed in North America, fueled by the idea of *Manifest Destiny*, a concept coined in 1845,[29] as railroads were built across the now-vast territory of the United States. In the 1890s, war was projected across the Pacific, when the US overthrew the Hawaiian kingdom and annexed its islands. In 1898, the US declared war on Spain after the USS Maine exploded in the harbor of Havana. Having. easily won the Spanish–American War in July 1898, the US secured the remnants of the Spanish Empire, notably Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam, under the *Treaty of Paris*, marking its transition from a regional to a global power.

In the early 20th century, the US intervened militarily in many Latin American countries in defense of its interests. President Woodrow Wilson landed US troops in Mexico in 1914 and several times thereafter: in Haiti in 1915; in the Dominican Republic in 1916; in Cuba in 1917; and in Panama in 1918. For most of the Wilson administration, the US military also occupied Nicaragua.

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[28] Monroe Doctrine. Encyclopaedia Britannica – https://www.britannica.com/event/Monroe-Doctrine, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[29] Manifest Destiny. History.com – https://www.history.com/topics/westward-expansion/manifest-destiny, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

Although the US declared neutrality and worked for peace in Europe when World War I broke out in 1914, US opinion turned against Germany when a German U-boat torpedoed the RMS Lusitania in 1915, causing the deaths of 128 US civilians and over 1,000 Britons. After a number of US merchant ships were sunk in 1917, the US declared war on Germany in April. After the German surrender, Wilson's Fourteen Point Program for World Peace, released in January 1918, was accepted as the basis for peace negotiations, also leading to the creation of the League of Nations.[30]

Although small US military interventions continued briefly in Latin America after World War I, the Hoover administration withdrew all US military forces, and President Roosevelt later announced a *Good Neighbor Policy* in which the US would accept whatever governments were chosen by its southern neighbors. The US endorsed article 8 of the 1933 *Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and Duties of States*, providing that "…no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."[31]

Still preferring to remain aloof from European wars, the US only officially entered World War II against Germany, Japan and Italy in December 1941, after Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Despite its formal neutrality, however, President Roosevelt had favored Britain and its allies, and the US had made military and financial aid available to the Allies through the Lend-Lease program. After its entry into the war, the US conducted military operations on both the Atlantic and Pacific fronts, providing the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, coordinating the Normandy landings, occupying Berlin with Britain, France and the USSR after Germany's surrender, and deploying atomic weapons to force Japan's surrender. After the war, amidst the economic devastation of its European and Asian rivals, the US was in a uniquely powerful position due to its enormous economic and military power.

3. Creating a "Rules-based International Order"

Capitalizing on its position, the US came to act as the anchor of the international system and of the rules-based order on which it was based. Its global influence in the last half of the 20th century was due chiefly to its having been the primary architect and constructor of the post-World-War-II era, whose pillars – the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, IBRD, IFC, IDA, MIGA, etc.), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later the World Trade Organization), and the International Court of Justice – reflected the values and the interests of the country whose economy had constituted 50 percent of the global GDP in 1946, and whose executive had demonstrated US military and economic power in bringing the war to an end. The title that Dean Acheson, President Truman's Secretary of State, selected for his autobiography – *Present at the Creation* – highlights Washington's formative role in shaping that order.

The adoption on 10 December 10, 1948 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA resolution 217 A), describing the fundamental rights that were henceforth to be protected by all states, represented a further step by the US in shaping the international order in accordance with its values. The UDHR paved the way for the adoption of more than 70 human rights treaties, applied today on a permanent basis around the world.[32] The

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[30] President Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points (1918), US National Archives – https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/president-woodrow-wilsons-14-points, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[31] Martin, Folly and Niall Palmer. The A to Z of US Diplomacy from World War I through World War II, (2010), p. 312. ISBN 9781461672418.

[32] See Universal Declaration of Human Rights – https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

divergent ideological emphases of the Western and Soviet blocs later found expression in two distinct covenants – on *Civil and Political Rights*[33] and on *Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*[34] – adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966. Both contributed, however, to shaping the international order.

Even in the depths of the Cold War – with NATO and the rest of the Western alliance structure (CENTO, SEATO and ANZUS) that had been assembled to contain Josef Stalin's ambitions, opposing the Warsaw Pact constructed by Moscow – the USSR-led COMECON[35] was no match for the Western economic triad of the IMF, World Bank and the GATT. Washington held the balance of power, also because it had enabled the reconstruction of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan[36], building on Jean Monnet's vision[37] of what became the European Economic Community and later the European Union, and reforming Japan through extensive military, political, economic and social transformation, and economic investment, between 1945 and 1952, led by General Douglas A. MacArthur.[38]

Both sides in the Cold War used covert operations to weaken or replace governments, some imposed by others, some democratically elected. These included, in the case of the US, Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Iraq (1959–2003), Cuba (1960–61), the Congo (1960–65), the Dominican Republic (1961), South Vietnam (1963), Brazil (1964) Chile (1973), Afghanistan (1979–2001) and Nicaragua (1981–90).[39] Research suggests that, between 1947 and 1989, the United States used its intelligence apparatus in efforts to change the governments of other states 72 times, in 66 covert operations and six overt efforts. Forty of the covert efforts failed, with 26 successfully bringing a US-backed government to power. Two foreign leaders – South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem and the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo – were killed by foreign intermediaries during US-backed coups. Covert actions to support militant groups seeking to topple a foreign regime usually failed. Of 36 attempts, only five overthrew their targets. Sponsoring coups proved more successful: Nine out of 14 attempted coups put US-backed leaders in power. Washington sought to influence 16 foreign elections by covertly funding, advising and spreading propaganda for its candidates, often

[33] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNGA resolution 2200A (XXI), December 16, 1966 – https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[34] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNGA resolution 2200A (XXI), December 16, 1966 – https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[35] COMECON, Encyclopaedia Britannica – https://www.britannica.com/topic/Comecon, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[36] Marshall Plan. History.com – https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/marshall-plan-1, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[37] Biographie de Jean Monnet, père fondateur de l'Union européenne, toute l'Europe, April 28, 2022 – https://www.touteleurope.eu/fonctionnement-de-l-ue/biographie-jean-monnet-1888-1979/, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[38] Occupation and Reconstruction of Japan, 1945–52. Office of the Historian, Department of State – https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/japan-reconstruction#:~:text=After%20the%20defeat%20of%20Japan,%2C%20economic%2C%20and%20social%20reforms, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[39] Littlejun, Becky. 10 Times America Helped Overthrow a Foreign Government: The US has long facilitated regime change to support its own strategic and business interests. History.com, June 7, 2022 – https://www.history.com/news/us-overthrow-foreign-governments, and Stuster, J. Dana. Mapped: The 7 Governments the U.S. Has Overthrown: Yes, we now have confirmation that the CIA was behind Iran's 1953 coup. But the agency hardly stopped there, in: Foreign Policy, August 20, 2013 – https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/mapped-the-7-governments-the-u-s-has-overthrown/, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

beyond a single election cycle. Of these, three-quarters of the US-backed parties won their elections.[40] The benefits of many even ostensibly successful campaigns were questionable, however: Leaders elected by foreign subterfuge tended to find that acting at the behest of a foreign backer brought domestic opposition, often leading them to change policies or abandon the foreign sponsor.[41]

4.   Bipolarity Gives Way to Triangulation and "the End of History"

The Sino-Soviet split on both ideological[42] and geopolitical[43] grounds between 1956 and 1961 greatly weakened the capacity of the Marxist–Leninist alliance[44] and, in the aftermath of the domestic chaos unleashed in China by Mao Zedong's *Cultural Revolution* initiated in 1966[45], paved the way for US President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Kissinger to effect Washington's opening to China between 1971 and 1979[46], and a triangular relationship between Washington, Moscow and Beijing.

The new wave of contestation between Moscow and Washington after the opening to China culminated in the election of US President Reagan in 1980 and CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev in 1985.[47] In 1987–88, Mr. Gorbachev, acknowledging the economic pressures confronting the USSR, transformed its domestic structures, adopting policies of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring). Under the former, freedom of information and expression were expanded, while the latter led to modest democratization of the Soviet political system and the introduction of

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[40]   O'Rourke, Lindsey A. The U.S. tried to change other countries' governments 72 times during the Cold War, in: Washington Post, December 23, 2016 – https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/23/the-cia-says-russia-hacked-the-u-s-election-here-are-6-things-to-learn-from-cold-war-attempts-to-change-regimes/, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[41]   Downes, Alexander B. and Lindsey A. O'Rourke. You Can't Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations, in: International Relations, Belfer Center, Fall 2016 – https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/you-cant-always-get-what-you-want-why-foreign-imposed-regime-change-seldom-improves, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[42]   In the late 1950s and early 1960s, divergence in the interpretation of orthodox Marxism led to disputes about the Soviet Union's policies of national de-Stalinization and international peaceful coexistence with the West, which Mao Zedong decried as Marxist revisionism.

[43]   The Chinese Communist Party's belligerent stance towards the West led to its rejection of Nikita Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence with Western powers. Beijing also resented Moscow's growing rapprochement with India due to the Sino-Indian border dispute, while Moscow feared that Beijing was an unreliable actor in the context of the risk of nuclear warfare.

[44]   In 1961, at the 22nd CPSU Congress, the USSR clarified the doctrinal dispute on the interpretation and application of Marxism–Leninism. In December 1961, the USSR broke diplomatic relations with Albania. In late 1962, the PRC ended its relations with the USSR because General Secretary Khrushchev had not confronted the US militarily in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Mao said that "Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism." Khrushchev replied that Mao's belligerent foreign policies would lead to an East–West nuclear war. Thereafter, the relationship allowed only written communications between the PRC and the USSR, with each capital justifying its geopolitical actions with formal statements of Marxist–Leninist ideology. In June 1963, the PRC published "The Chinese Communist Party's Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," to which the CPSU replied with the Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1964, Mao said that, in light of the Chinese and Soviet differences about the interpretation and practical application of orthodox Marxism, a counter-revolution had re-established capitalism in the USSR. The USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries then ended their relations with the PRC.

[45]   Cultural Revolution, Encyclopaedia Britannica – https://www.britannica.com/event/Cultural-Revolution, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[46]   US Relations With China 1949 – 2022, Council on Foreign Relations – https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[47]   Mikhail Gorbachev, Encyclopaedia Britannica – https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mikhail-Gorbachev, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

limited free-market mechanisms in the Soviet economy. President Reagan's expansion of US military capacity, both in strategic and tactical nuclear deployment, and through the *Reagan doctrine*, which confronted Moscow in proxy wars in central Asia, Latin America and Africa, forced the USSR to overextend its economy by matching US military expansion, leading to unsustainable stresses.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany in 1989 was followed by the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, paving the way for a new era of US dominance, leading France's then-Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine to describe the US as *un hyperpuissance*.[48]

Francis Fukuyama's first famous article was entitled *The End of History?* – note the question mark! In that article in The National Interest (1989), Dr. Fukuyama tentatively asserted:

> "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." [49]

He later went further, removing the interrogation mark in the book that followed, *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992)[50], drawing on the dialectic of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, to postulate that the ascendancy of Western models of liberal democracy and free markets signaled the end point of humanity's sociocultural evolution and political contestation. In criticizing Fukuyama's book, Jacques Derrida described it as a celebration of the economic and cultural hegemony of Western liberalism.[51]

In his original analysis, Dr. Fukuyama, who later significantly modified the absolutism of his thesis,[52] grounded his assertion on the dialectical opposition of Western liberalism and *scientific socialism* – the ideology of the USSR, and the collapse of the Soviet model in the context of the dialectic.

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[48]   Védrine, Hubert. Les États-Unis : hyperpuissance ou empire ?, in: Cités 2004/4 (No. 20), pp. 139–151 – https://www.cairn.info/revue-cites-2004-4-page-139.htm, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[49]   Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History?, in: The National Interest, 16 (1989), pp. 3–18 [173–89]

[50]   Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press: 1992). ISBN 978-0-02-910975-5.

[51]   Derrida, Jacques. Spectres de Marx: l'état de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale (Éditions Galileé, 1993).

[52]   See i.a. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. Free Press, 1995. ISBN 0-02-910976-0; The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order. Free Press. 1999. ISBN 0-684-84530-X[55]; Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2002. ISBN 0-374-23643-7; State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2004. ISBN 0-8014-4292-3; America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2006. ISBN 0-300-11399-4; The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2011. ISBN 978-1-846-68256-8; Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Present Day. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2014. ISBN 978-0-374-22735-7; Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2018; Liberalism and Its Discontents, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2022. Dr. Fukuyama later came to emphasize the importance of national identity in the defense of liberal values – and the need to reconcile the nation-state with liberal universalism:

"Liberalism, with its universalist pretensions, may sit uneasily alongside seemingly parochial nationalism, but the two can be reconciled…Liberal rights are meaningless if they cannot be enforced by a state…The territorial jurisdiction of a state necessarily corresponds to the area occupied by the group of individuals who signed on to the social contract. People living outside that jurisdiction must have their rights respected, but not necessarily enforced, by that state…The need for international cooperation in addressing issues such as global warming and pandemics has never been more evident. But it remains the case that one particular form of power, the ability to enforce rules through the threat or the actual use of force, remains under the control of

The End of History and the Last Man undoubtedly contributed to the hubris that emerged in some US policy actions in the 1990s and 2000s, drawing on bold assertions of "America's" moral and political superiority that had been articulated earlier in powerful speeches by President Reagan[53] ahead of the collapse of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.

5. US Operations against Other Parties

These set the stage for unilateral interventions by Washington, as well as others under the auspices of the UN Security Council[54] and, later, in "coalitions of the willing" assembled by the George W. Bush (43) administration that culminated in the invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein without the approval of the UN Security Council in 2003, and the NATO deployment in Libya on March 19, 2011 under UN Security Council Resolution 1973, where NATO forces, initially under the leadership of France and the United Kingdom, exceeded the mandate of the UN Security Council to effect a ceasefire in Libya and a no-fly zone to protect civilians against attacks, by killing Muammar Ghaddafi.

Already in 1999, during the Balkan Wars after the fracture of Yugoslavia, Mr. Clinton had authorized the use of the US armed forces in *Operation Allied Force*, a NATO bombing campaign to halt ethnic cleansing of Albanians by nationalist Serbs in Kosovo, after the deployment and subsequent restructuring of United Nations Protection Force operations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina between February 1992 and March 1995. This was the first use of military force by NATO without the authorization of the UN Security Council, and was justified in Washington by the scale of the brutality of the Yugoslav People's Army commanded by Slobodan Milošević, who was later charged

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nation-states…Ultimate power, in other words, continues to be the province of nation-states, which means that the control of power at this level remains critical…There is thus no necessary contradiction between liberal universalism and the need for nation-states. Although the normative value of human rights may be universal, enforcement power is not; it is a scarce resource that is necessarily applied in a territorially delimited way." (Francis Fukuyama, A Country of Their Own: Liberalism Needs the Nation, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2022 – https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-01/francis-fukuyama-liberalism-country), [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[53] Many of these speeches were artfully crafted by Margaret Ellen [Peggy] Noonan, a primary speechwriter and Special Assistant to President Reagan in the mid-1980s. With her help, President Reagan had often invoked the image of the US as the "city upon a hill," also in his election night speech in 1980. In his valedictory address eight years later, he described that vision:

"A tall, proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, wind-swept, God-blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace; a city with free ports that hummed with commerce and creativity. And if there had to be city walls, the walls had doors and the doors were open to anyone with the will and the heart to get here. That's how I saw it, and see it still." (https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/ronald-reagan-farewell-address-shining-city/2019/01/11/id/897815/), [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[54] (1) In 1990–91, the US intervened in Kuwait to lead a coalition to repel invading Iraqi forces led by Saddam Hussein, in the Gulf War, mandated by Baghdad's violation of UN SC Res. 678 which gave Iraq until January 15, 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait and empowered states to use "all necessary means" to force Iraq out of Kuwait after that date. (2) The US engaged in Somalia as part of UNOSOM I (1992–93) and UNOSOM II (1993–95), a UN humanitarian relief operation. (3) The US participated in Operation Uphold Democracy, a UN mission to reinstate Haiti's President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, after a military coup. (4) The US and other NATO allies engaged in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) established in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina from February 1992 to March 1995, during the Balkan Wars after the fracture of Yugoslavia. The UN peacekeeping mission was restructuring into three other forces: the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia, and the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), with restructured UNPROFOR operations ongoing in Bosnia and Herzegovina until their replacement by NATO and EU missions in December 1995. (6) In 1995, US President Clinton ordered US and NATO aircraft to attack Bosnian Serb targets to halt attacks on UN safe zones and to pressure them into a peace accord. Mr. Clinton deployed US peacekeepers to Bosnia in late 1995.

by the *International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia* with war crimes in connection with the Bosnian War, the Croatian War of Independence and the Kosovo War.[55]

The NATO bombing damaged bridges, roads and railway tracks, some 25,000 homes, 69 schools, 19 hospitals and 20 health centers, and 176 cultural monuments, including the Dr. Dragiša Miskovic University Hospital Centre. NATO bombing also resulted in damage to medieval monuments – the Gračanica Monastery, the Patriarchate of Peć and the Visoki Dečani, now on UNESCO's World Heritage list – as well as the Avala Tower. The Russian government was harshly critical of US and NATO actions in this campaign[56]. Amnesty International[57] and Israel's then-Foreign Minister Arial Sharon[58] were among other critics.

In June 1999, a Finnish-Russian mediation team headed by Martti Ahtisaari and Viktor Chernomyr-din met in Belgrade with then-President Milošević to negotiate an agreement to suspend air strikes. After NATO agreed that the UN would exercise political responsibility for Kosovo, and that no in-dependence referendum would take place for three years, Mr. Milošević agreed to withdraw his forces from Kosovo after diplomatic pressure from Moscow. The bombing was suspended on June 10, and the Yugoslav Army and NATO signed the Kumanovo Agreement, ending the war on June 11. Russian paratroopers seized Slatina airport to become the first Peacekeeping Force in the war zone. On June 12, the US Army's 82nd Airborne 2–505th Parachute Infantry Regiment entered Kosovo as part of *Operation Joint Guardian.*

Shortly before this, in 1998, in response to the Al-Qaeda bombings of US Embassies in East Africa that killed a dozen Americans and hundreds of Africans, President Clinton had ordered *Operation Infinite Reach* on August 20, 1998, leading the US Navy to launch cruise missiles at Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan believed to be producing chemical weapons for Al-Qaeda. This was the first publicly acknowledged pre-emptive strike against a violent non-state actor conducted by the US military.

6. Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria

Arguably, US engagement in the "broader Middle East" – Afghanistan and the Levant – reflected Washington's propensity to circumvent the potential constraints of the UN Security Council to the greatest extent. In fact, however, this was true only in Iraq. In Afghanistan, NATO allies responded immediately to the attack by Al-Qaeda under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, and the Security Council authorized the US to invade, and NATO to establish the *International Security Assistance Force* to provide military support to a newly-established, pro-Western government after the displacement of the Taliban. In March 2002, the Security Council established *the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan* to manage all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities. In

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[55] See i.a. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Decision on Assigned Counsel Request for Provisional Release, United Nations. March 5, 2007. Archived from the original on March 4, 2006.

[56] See Averre, Derek. From Pristina to Tskhinvali: The Legacy of Operation Allied Force in Russia's Relations with the West, in: International Affairs Vol. 85, No. 3 (2009), pp. 575–591; and Yesson, Erik. NATO and Rus-sia in Kosovo, in: Perspectives No. 13, Special Issue: The Balkans, NATO and European Security after the Kosovo War, Winter 1999/2000, pp. 11–19.

[57] See No justice for the victims of NATO bombings, Amnesty International. April 23, 2009. Archived from the original on February 17, 2013.

[58] See Ariel Sharon... by Robert Fisk. Archived September 26, 2015 at the Wayback Machine, Friday January 6, 2006, The Independent.

Syria, a peacekeeping mission, the *United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria*, was set up in 2012 under UN Security Council Resolution 2043 in response to the Syrian Civil War.

Afghanistan

After a strike on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 by Al-Qaeda terrorists who hijacked four civilian aircraft, crashing two into both towers of the World Trade Center, killing 2,192 civilians and 414 rescue personnel; one into the west side of the Pentagon, killing 189 people including 64 on the flight; and one with 44 people into a field in Pennsylvania, the US launched *Operation Enduring Freedom* on October 7, to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and destroy Al-Qaeda's terrorist network. Within two months, US forces had effectively removed the Taliban from power, but the war continued, as US and coalition forces attempted to defeat a Taliban insurgency campaign coordinated from Pakistan. Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces at a hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan on May 2, 2011. In June 2011, then-President Obama announced the beginning of troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, but it took until August 2021 for all US and NATO forces to withdraw in a relatively chaotic operation after the Taliban had seized control of the country. The inefficiency of the withdrawal and the consequences for Afghan civilians were widely criticized, not least by Afghanistan's neighbors.

After the withdrawal of US and NATO forces, the Russian government hosted representatives from China, Pakistan, Iran and India, as well as the Taliban, for talks on Afghanistan's future on October 20, 2021. China hosted a series of multilateral meetings on aid to Afghanistan in 2022 in the wake of the implosion of the economy that left millions on the edge of starvation. The Foreign Ministers of Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as the Taliban, attended the third meeting of the *Foreign Ministers of Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan* in April, coordinated by PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and aimed "…to help Afghanistan achieve peace, stability, and development at an early date." This was followed by another meeting of the "extended troika" of China, Russia, Pakistan, and the US.[59]

In a statement delivered to the conference, President Xi Jinping said Afghanistan's neighbors should put more effort into enabling the war-torn nation to rebuild. A "peaceful, stable, developed and prosperous Afghanistan" is what Afghans aspire to, Mr. Xi said, adding this would "serve the common interests of regional countries and the international community."[60]

Iraq

The US invasion of Iraq, supported by the United Kingdom, but not by France or Germany, and undertaken without a UN Security Council mandate, began in March 2003, when US and UK forces invaded Iraq to destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and displace Saddam Hussein. On May 1, 2003, US President Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq. The intelligence on WMD proved illusory, however, and a violent insurgency arose after Saddam's deposition, leading to protracted counter-insurgency operations by the Western allied forces and a loss

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59 See O'Donnell, Lynne. The Taliban Didn't Get Chinese Recognition, but They're Getting Chinese Help: Multilateral talks in China this week shied from recognizing the Taliban, but Beijing is still playing ball, in: Foreign Policy, March 31, 2022 – https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/31/taliban-china-afghanistan-relations-investment-recognition/, [retrieved April 2, 2022].

60 See Ng, Teddy. China urges US to unlock Afghanistan's frozen assets: Beijing seeks to bolster regional role by hosting conference attended by Russian and American officials. China has yet to recognise the Taliban government, but calls for neighbours to respect Afghanistan's sovereignty and independence, in: South China Morning Post, March 31, 2022 – https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3172573/china-urges-us-unlock-afghanistans-frozen-assets, [retrieved April 2, 2022].

of public support. Although Saddam was captured, tried and hanged and democratic elections were held, over 4,700 US and allied troop were killed, as well as more than 100,000 Iraqi civilians. The US troop drawdown began on February 1, 2009 and was formally declared at an end on December 18, 2011.[61]

Action in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State

The *Islamic State* (alternatively, the *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant*, the *Islamic State of Iraq and Syria*, or *Daesh* (داعش)), a militant Salafi jihadist branch of Sunni Islam, founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999, drove Iraqi security forces out of key cities in Anbar, captured Mosul and effected a massacre in Sinjar in 2014. After expanding into Syria in April 2013 and proclaiming a worldwide caliphate, it began to use the name *Islamic State* (الدولة الإسلامية). A *Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant* was assembled by the US to "…work together under a common, multifaceted, and long-term strategy to degrade and defeat ISIL/Daesh." Fifty-nine national governments and the European Union joined in the coalition in December 2014. On March 23, 2019, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces said the Islamic State's five-year caliphate had ended after ISIS was defeated in Syria, although the group was still seen as a security threat capable of mounting attacks in the region.[62]

The Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war began in September 2015, after the Syrian government asked for military aid against rebel groups. It initially involved air strikes by Russian aircraft from the Khmeimim base against targets in north-western Syria, and against Syrian opposition militant groups opposed to the Syrian government, including the *Syrian National Coalition, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, al-Nusra Front* and the *Army of Conquest.* Russian special operations forces and military advisors were also deployed to Syria. Russian officials said that, apart from fighting the Islamic State, its goals were to enable the Syrian government to retake territory from anti-government groups. In October 2015, President Putin said Russia's goal was "…stabilising the legitimate power in Syria and creating the conditions for political compromise."

Russia's Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov said that the Russian Air Force had carried out 19,160 combat missions and delivered 71,000 strikes on "the infrastructure of terrorists." In early December 2017, Mr. Putin travelled to Syria and addressed Russian troops at the Khmeimim military base, saying that, "…in a little more than two years, Russia's Armed Forces, together with Syria's army, routed the most battleworthy group of international terrorists [there was]."[63]

The distinctive feature of the Syrian civil war was the engagement of Russia in support of President Assad, and that of the US in support of "moderate" Sunni forces seeking to displace him. The two capitals found a measure of alignment only in their joint determination to defeat ISIS.

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[61] The Iraq War 2003–2011, Council on Foreign Relations – https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[62] Islamic State group defeated as final territory lost, US-backed forces say. BBC News, March 23, 2019 – https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47678157, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[63] Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war, Wikipedia – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_military_intervention_in_the_Syrian_civil_war, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

III Globalization Transforms the Geo-economic and Geopolitical Landscape

The last decade of the 20th century saw the first phase of the *information* (or *knowledge*, or *digital*) era, introducing new opportunities unprecedented since the Industrial Revolution had replaced kinship with class as the foundation of social organization in the early 19th century, and industry had supplanted agriculture and maritime trade as the primary means of creating economic value.

A new age emerged in the 1990s – shaped by *globalization*, an awkward word for a powerful phenomenon – rooted in:

▪ the emergence of powerful multinational corporations, initially in North America, Western Europe and Japan, due to rapid improvements in industrial technology and extensive international communication;

▪ better insight into global demographics that had emerged from research by the World Bank in the mid-1980s, when population growth in the triad had slowed to non-replacement levels, and that indicated the future dominance of markets and manufacturing in Asia, excluding Japan; (which were anticipated to grow by 700 million persons between 1985 and 2000) and in Africa (expected to rise by over 300 million in the same period);

▪ enhanced access to vast new markets in China and Eurasia in the aftermath of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in the PRC from 1980[64], and the collapse of the USSR in 1991; and

▪ the exceptionally rapid commercialization of information technologies and systems developed in the defense and aerospace industries during the Cold War, which permeated private industry thereafter, boosting the growth of consumer electronics, prompting the confluence of computing, communications and entertainment technologies; and driving adoption of the new digital systems by global financial institutions.

The near universal availability of information via the internet; the internationalization of production after the liberalization of exchange controls and capital markets which shifted the balance of power from governments to multinational companies; the scale and speed of flows of financial capital that soon vastly outstripped the size of the "real" economy; and the progressive homogenization of global consumer values effected by global (largely English-language) broadcasting, global branding and global advertising all defined the era of globalization. The principles of economic and political liberalization, encouraging reliance on market mechanisms and consumer choice, and requiring governments to adapt to market demands to attract investment, became its *leitmotiv*.

In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997), the Emerging Markets Financial Crisis (1998) and the Dot-com crash (2002), the Global Financial Crisis from 2007–2009, which translated into the "Great Recession" and required unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimuli to restore global

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64 Deng Xiaoping. Encyclopaedia Britannica – https://www.britannica.com/biography/Deng-Xiaoping, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

growth, highlighted the contagion that had been created in deeply connected global financial mar-kets[65], the pernicious impact of widening income and wealth disparities in many societies[66], exacerbated by the concentration of market power in key economic sectors[67], and the disruptive effects of the integrated technological transformation effected by the first post-industrial bio-digital revolution.[68]

This crisis, the quantitative easing employed by the Federal Reserve to address straightened eco-nomic conditions in the US, the inflationary impacts in Emerging Markets due to a flood of portfolio capital in search of higher returns, the widespread social and political dislocation in Western coun-tries, including *the Occupy Wall Street*[69] campaigns, BREXIT and the spread of populism and "illiberal democracy"[70] exacerbated by waves of forced migration into Europe from Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, led non-Western countries, and particularly the People's Republic of China, to ques-tion Washington's perspicacity and policy insights – and those of the West more broadly – and both to look inwards and to deepen "south-south" collaboration, through the Belt and Road, the BRICS, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund. This also contributed to Mr. Putin's conviction that the West was in decline and that he should pursue his objectives to restore Russia's international standing by reversing the losses that had followed the collapse of the USSR.

1.   Present Challenges

The progressive integration of the global economy in recent decades – notably through digital tech-nologies that connected financial systems, supply chains, and energy networks around the world – came to constrain the capacity of national governments to act independently to secure the welfare of their citizens, thus weakening trust in governments and other domestic institutions. This contin-uing erosion of trust has been demonstrated in the *Edelman Trust Barometer* over the past several years. The 2022 Barometer stated:

> "We find a world ensnared in a vicious cycle of distrust, fuelled by a growing lack of faith in media and government. Through disinformation and division, these two institutions are feeding the cycle and exploiting it for commercial and political gain."

The 2022 *Edelman Barometer* continued:

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[65]   Soros, George. The Crisis & What to Do About It, in: The New York Review of Books, November 6, 2008 – https://www.georgesoros.com/2008/11/06/the_crisis_what_to_do_about_it/, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[66]   Turner, Adair. Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance, (Princeton: 2016), ISBN 9780691169644 – https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691169644/between-debt-and-the-devil; and Piketty, Thomas. Capital in the Twenty-First Century, (2017) – https://www.amazon.com/Capital-Twenty-First-Century-Thomas-Piketty/dp/0674979850, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[67]   Foroohar, Rana. A light shines on the concentration of power in Silicon Valley: Oligopoly is showing itself to be the economic and political challenge of our time, in: Financial Times, July 22, 2018 – https://www.ft.com/con-tent/02b6d334-8c2d-11e8-b18d-0181731a0340, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[68]   See e.g. Schwab, Klaus. The Fourth Industrial Revolution, January 3, 2017 - https://www.amazon.com/Fourth-Industrial-Revolution-Klaus-Schwab/dp/1524758868. The technological revolution now underway, due to the confluence of congruent info-, bio-, nano- and neuro-technologies, can more properly be conceived as a post-industrial bio-digital revolution, however, confronting us with profound epistemological (is knowledge an exclu-sively human quality?) and ontological (what defines the essence of human existence?) questions, and redefines the basis of natural law (*ius naturalis*).

[69]   Occupy Wall Street: We are the 99 percent – http://occupywallst.org/, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[70]   Papas, Takis S. The Specter Haunting Europe: Distinguishing Liberal Democracy's Challengers, in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2016), pp. 22–36.

"Classic societal leaders in government, the media and business have been discredited. Trust, once hierarchical, has become local and dispersed as people rely on *my employer, my colleagues, my family*. Coinciding with this upheaval is a collapse of trust within democracies[71] and a trust surge within autocracies.

"The media business model has become dependent on generating partisan outrage, while the political model has become dependent on exploiting it. Whatever short-term benefits either institution derives, it is a long-term catastrophe for society. Distrust is now society's default emotion, with nearly 60 percent inclined to distrust."[72]

Trust Falls in Democracies – Edelman Trust Barometer 2022

2022 Edelman Trust Barometer.
The Trust Index is the average percent trust in NGOs, business, government and media. TRU_INS.
Below is a list of institutions. For each one, please indicate how much you trust that institution to do what is right. 9-point scale; top 4 box, trust. General population, 27-mkt avg.

Civic disaffection has led many citizens to defect from voting, and membership of political parties has fallen in most "democratic" countries. Even the "third wave" of democratization in the developing world between 1975 and 2005 has stalled and regressed in the past decade. The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2021 *Democracy Index* recorded the largest fall in the population living in democracies since 2010, just after the global financial crisis. Less than half (45.7 percent) of the

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71 In many of the democracies studied, institutions are trusted by less than half of their people, including only 46 percent in Germany, 45 percent in Spain, 44 percent in the UK and 43 percent in the US. Moreover, no developed countries believe their families and self will be better off in five years' time. – https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2022-01/Trust%2022_Top10.pdf, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

72 Edelman. 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer: The Cycle of Distrust – https://www.edelman.com/trust/2022-trust-barometer, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

world's population lived in a democracy of some sort in 2021. Even fewer (6.4 percent) resided in a "full democracy." More than a third (37.1 percent) lived under authoritarian rule, many of whom in China. The editors concluded:

> "This reflects the worst global score since the *Democracy Index* was first produced in 2006."[73]

Social media have transformed social and political landscapes, trapping citizens and those not yet of voting age, in echo chambers defined by mutually exclusive assertions of truth, undermining civil discourse and driving political polarization. A growing number of societies, including those in the Advanced Economies, are deeply fractured.

Income and wealth disparities have continued to widen.[74] The *2021 World Inequality Report* recorded that the richest 10 percent of the global population earned 52 percent of global income, while the poorer half earned 8 percent. The poorer half of the global population, meanwhile, owned 2 percent of global wealth, while the richest 10 percent owned 76 percent.[75]

Governments, not surprisingly, given their constrained abilities and the trust deficits, are struggling to adapt. This poses problems on two levels.

First, global governance and most forms of transnational collective action needed to address the needs of the global commons and provide global public goods are significantly weaker.

Second, the interplay between long-range geo-economic trends, geopolitical tensions and social inequality, exacerbated by the radical bio-digital transformation of the technological landscape due to the Fourth Industrial Revolution, is fracturing national societies, weakening representative democracy and inhibiting collective action on global challenges, including climate, oceans, biodiversity, health and a range of conventional and unconventional security threats.

The United Nations and its specialized agencies, including the IMF and World Bank, as well as the GATT, were designed by the victorious allies after World War II to address the challenges of that era. The inability of these institutions to respond to the demands of the present is evident in the dysfunction of the UN Security Council and Secretariat during the war in Ukraine[76], the continuation

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[73] EIU Democracy Index 2021 – https://www.eiu.com/n/democracy-index-2021-less-than-half-the-world-lives-in-a-democracy/, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[74] Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett. Tackling inequality takes social reform: In separate books, leading economists explore the wide-ranging changes needed to produce a more just society, in: Nature, June 22, 2022 – https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-01680-5?WT.ec_id=NATURE-20220623&utm_source=nature_etoc&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20220623&sap-outbound-id=E6C583F67B31F49E66292A8C44DF2CCB5C741B98, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[75] These charts show the growing income inequality between the world's richest and poorest, World Economic Forum, December 10, 2021 – https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/12/global-income-inequality-gap-report-rich-poor/#:~:text=Income%20and%20wealth%20inequalities%20significant&text=The%20richest%2010%25%20of%20the,half%20will%20earn%20just%20%243%2C920, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[76] Importantly, the UN General Assembly, in its 11th Emergency Special Session, under the *Uniting for Peace* framework, adopted A/RES/ES-11/1 on March 2, 2022 by 141 votes to 5, with 35 abstentions, reaffirming the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, deploring Russian aggression and demanding that Russia withdraw its forces. It called on all parties to observe international humanitarian and human rights law, and for peaceful resolution of the conflict through political dialogue and negotiations. On March 24, under the same framework, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/ES-11/L.2 by140 votes to 5, with 38 abstentions, demanding immediate cessation of Russia's hostilities, condemning violations of human rights, and calling on all parties to respect international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. On April 7, the General Assembly resolved to suspend Russia's membership of the UN Human Rights Council due to its

of longstanding tensions in the World Trade Organization despite the achievements of the 12th Ministerial Conference[77], and weaknesses in the World Health Organization that were all too apparent during the COVID-19 pandemic.[78] This COVID-19 crisis also exposed our systemic social weaknesses, sharpening the economic and social divides in all societies, and between the Advanced Economies and Least-Developed Countries.[79]

Russia's President Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, in violation of the UN Charter and peremptory rules of international humanitarian and human rights law. Having failed to deter his invasion, and being unwilling to assume the risks of exercising its "responsibility to protect"[80] Ukraine's civilian population and infrastructure[81] with "no-fly zones,"[82] the countries of the NATO Alliance, joined by their Asian allies, imposed successive, more extensive rounds of sanctions on Russia with second and third order impacts throughout the global system, deepening food and energy crises, driving up inflation, heightening financial volatility, disrupting global supply chains and raising the risk of stagflation. Nothing can excuse Moscow's behavior, but the failure of deterrence and the decision to respond with extensive economic and financial sanctions have extended the costs globally.

A crisis of this sort has been building since the end of the 20th century. Far from being a "global village,"[83] the world in the past two decades has been characterized increasingly by profound, multivariate asymmetry between a highly integrated global economy[84], the absence of a

"…violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law…, including gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights." The resolution was adopted by 93 votes to 24, with 58 abstentions.

77   Twelfth WTO Ministerial Conference – https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc12_e/mc12_e.htm, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

78   Jenny Lei Ravelo. WHO 'needs more powers' says independent panel co-chair Helen Clark. Devex, May 12, 2021 – https://www.devex.com/news/who-needs-more-powers-says-independent-panel-co-chair-helen-clark-99861, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

79   Kharas, Homi and Meagan Dooley. Long-run impacts of COVID-19 on extreme poverty. Brookings, June 2, 2021 – https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/06/02/long-run-impacts-of-covid-19-on-extreme-poverty/, [retrieved July 7, 2022]. The World Bank and IMF have made similar estimates.

80   Responsibility to Protect, United National Office on Genocide Protection and the Responsibility to Protect – https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

81   The Stimson Center has argued for enhanced capacity on the part of NATO to address this need: Andrew Hyde and Marla Keenan, NATO Needs to Move Protection of Civilians to Center Stage: The Ukraine war shows why the alliance's upcoming summit cannot give short shrift to the topic of human security. Stimson Center, June 16, 2022 – https://www.stimson.org/2022/nato-needs-to-move-protection-of-civilians-to-center-stage/?utm_source=Stimson+Center&utm_campaign=a1038a2c4c-RA%2FComms%2FNATO+Summit&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_15c3e20f70-a1038a2c4c-438292662, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

82   EU Council President Michel observed: "Russia is a nuclear power, and we are well aware that if this conflict turns into [a conflict] between NATO and Russia, we will roll down into the Third World War." NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that although Mr. Putin's brutal invasion had "shaken the international order" and shattered "peace on our continent," NATO is "…not part of this conflict" and the war should not "escalate beyond Ukraine." US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that a no-fly zone could lead to a "full-fledged war in Europe."

83   Although the term is widely associated with Thomas Friedman, it was coined by the Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan in The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (1962) and Understanding Media (1964).

84   Borin, Alessandro, Michele Mancini and Daria Taglioni. Measuring Exposure to Risk in Global Value Chains, Policy Research Working Paper Series, No. 9785, World Bank, Washington DC, September 2021 – https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/36314/Countries-and-Sectors-in-Global-Value-Chains.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

commensurate sense of global community[85], and a defective global polity.[86] This had led to normative clashes, economic and social volatility, weak economic governance and rising social and geopolitical turbulence. Mr. Putin, for example, warned bluntly of his discontent with the global system at the *Munich Security Conference* in 2007 and in a series of explicit speeches thereafter.[87]

In the face of a secular shift of the geo-economic center of gravity towards the Indo-Pacific, a reduction in the capacity and appetite of the US for global power projection, and challenges to the international rules-based order crafted after 1945 and revisited in 1991, regional geopolitical tensions have boiled over into war in Ukraine (after earlier conflict in Georgia in 2008, and Crimea and the Donbas in 2014), and heightened tensions in East Asia over Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and the South China Sea, in the Himalayas between India and China, and between the Mediterranean and Central Asia, notably in the Persian/Arabian Gulf and the Levant, involving Iran, Israel, Turkey and Gulf monarchies.

In the aftermath of the onset of war in Ukraine, these looming crises, involving nuclear weapons states in China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Israel and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and a threshold nuclear power in Iran, as well as other technologically sophisticated states in Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, pose the risk of brinkmanship and possible violent conflict.

Meanwhile, the decision of the Biden administration to frame the primary geopolitical challenge confronting the US as one between "techno-democracies" (the US and its allies)[88] and "techno-autocracies" (Russia and the People's Republic of China)[89], limits the scope for normative discussion and global collaboration, and increases the risk of large-scale geopolitical and economic realignment, with the world fragmenting into "…distinct economic blocs with different ideologies,

85 Guterres, António. Danger of 'Great Fracture is Real', Warns Secretary-General, Citing 4 Global Threats in Briefing to General Assembly on Work of United Nations: He says New Year Dawning amid Surging Geopolitical Tensions, Existential Climate Crisis, Deep Mistrust, Risky Technology. United Nations, January 22, 2020 – https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/ga12238.doc.htm, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

86 See a further series of speeches by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, Call for Action to put-out five-alarm global fire, January 21, 2022 – https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1110292; and Nelson Mandela Lecture: "Tackling the Inequality Pandemic: A New Social Contract for a New Era" – https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-07-18/secretary-generals-nelson-mandela-lecture-%E2%80%9Ctackling-the-inequality-pandemic-new-social-contract-for-new-era%E2%80%9D-delivered, [retrieved July 7, 2020].

87 Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007 – http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034; and in a series of speeches in 2014 at the Valdai Discussion Club – http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860, as well as in 2021 and 2022; see also Solana, Javier. *Ukraine and the Fundamentals of European Security*. Project Syndicate, January 21, 2022 – https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-ukraine-crisis-requires-european-diplomatic-role-by-javier-solana-2022-01?barrier=accesspaylog, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

88 Rodrik, Dani. The other side of US exceptionalism. Project Syndicate, June 8, 2022 – https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-exceptionalism-china-challenge-international-order-by-dani-rodrik-2022-06, [retrieved July 7, 2020].

89 In an interview with CBS, US Secretary of State Blinken said in respect of China: "And we have many big issues, but we have one of the most, I think, defining issues of our time will be the fault line between techno-democracies on the one hand, and techno-autocracies, like China, on the other hand, and whose rules, whose norms, whose values – to the extent technology is infused with values – carry the day, is going to make a huge difference in the lives of people across this planet. We have to do a much better job in leading, coordinating, working with the other techno-democracies to make sure that we carry the day and not China." For a critical perspective on this stark dichotomy, see Kupchan, Charles A. Biden's Foreign Policy Needs a Course Correction. Project Syndicate, May 14, 2021 – https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/biden-foreign-policy-cold-war-ideology-or-twenty-first-century-pragmatism-by-charles-a-kupchan-2021-05, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

political systems, technology standards, cross-border payment and trade systems, and reserve currencies," in the words of the IMF's Chief Economist, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas.[90]

In the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said at the Atlantic Council in April 2022 that, as Russia had "…flaunted the rules, norms, and values that underpin the international economy," the US and its allies would "…no longer extend to [Moscow] the privilege of trading or investing with us." She said that the US and its allies were "…acting in support of our principles: our opposition to aggression, widespread violence against civilians, and in alignment with our commitment to a rules-based global order that protects peace and prosperity."

Secretary Yellen thus envisaged the radical realignment of global supply chains:

> "Favoring the friend-shoring of supply chains to a large number of trusted countries, so we can continue to securely extend market access, will lower the risks to our economy as well as to our trusted trade partners."[91]

Referring to that concept, ECB President Lagarde said in April at the Peterson Institute for International Economics:

> "Today, rising geopolitical tensions mean our global economy is changing. And once more, fluctuating value systems and shifting alliances are creating a new global map of economic relations. It is still too early to say how this will play out, but one can already see the emergence of three distinct shifts in global trade. These are the shifts from *dependence to diversification*, from *efficiency to security*, and from *globalisation to regionalisation*."[92]

While securing supply chains against disruption is clearly important, it is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for regional and global social and political stability. Fragmentation of the global architecture, and abandonment of the normative underpinnings of a rules-based international order inherently weakens our collective ability to respond to the range of conventional and non-conventional security threats we confront, as well as the looming disruption of the earth system, manifest in climate change and the rising frequency of extreme weather events, ocean acidification and pollution, and the destruction of biodiversity, all of which also increase the risk of more frequent pandemics as climate comes to change the vectors of disease transmission.[93]

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[90] Bhatt, Gita. A Deeper Look at Forces Fragmenting Our World – And How to Respond: Why We Must Resist Geoeconomic Fragmentation – And How, in: IMF Blog, June 2, 2022 – https://blogs.imf.org/2022/06/02/a-more-fragmented-world/, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[91] Transcript: US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen on the next steps for Russia sanctions and 'friend-shoring' supply chains. Atlantic Council, April 13, 2022 – https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/transcript-us-treasury-secretary-janet-yellen-on-the-next-steps-for-russia-sanctions-and-friend-shoring-supply-chains/, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[92] A new global map: European resilience in a changing world, Keynote speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, April 22, 2022 – https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp220422~c43af3db20.en.html, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[93] Pandemics and the Global Environment, Science Advances (AASS), Vol. 6, Issue 28, July 10, 2020 – https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/6/28/eabd1325?fbclid=IwAR2LQ7wb5md-TUj7ZmxIQYcE8FR0Zi-Pdto2gtSqvNWT9rL6klStLBDSlN4, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

2. Synthetic Conclusions

The international rules-based order is at an inflection point, due to the interaction of forces within the complex, dynamical system[94] that comprises human society that have been building for decades.

The present instability of our global political, economic and social systems is likely to persist for some time. There is no short-term prospect of the spontaneous emergence of a new *systemic equilibrium*. Over at least a millennium, every period of comparative regional (and where relevant, global) stability has been defined by an equilibrium of forces within an inter-state order recognized by all state-actors as legitimate, in that it protected their vital interests. These orders persist, erode and become dysfunctional over decades. Reconceptualization and reconstruction have occurred to date only in the aftermath of destructive, violent conflicts.[95]

The erosion of *normative coherence* founded on universal fundamental rights and "mainstream values" predisposes to issues-based cultural fragmentation within and between societies[96] and divergent political agendas that will further undermine both liberal democracy and coherent global governance.

Both ideological and social polarization predispose to deeper fissures within national societies and the radicalization of faith-based communities, and invite exploitation by political mavericks[97]. The boundaries between competition and conflict will be increasingly blurred, with asymmetric warfare including cyberattacks and digital and analogue defamation becoming commonplace between states, corporations and ideological interest groups. Much of this is already evident in the confident and impassioned assertion of "alternative facts."[98]

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[94] Complex systems have several defining characteristics: Many strongly interdependent variables, interacting in non-linear ways, with multiple inputs contributing to observed outputs, making attribution of causes and effects very difficult; feedback loops which may either amplify or disperse the impact of a change in an element of the system; chaotic behavior, defined chiefly by extreme sensitivity to initial conditions, fractal geometry, emergence, and self-organizing criticality; multiple (meta)stable states, where a small change in the prevailing conditions may precipitate a major change in the system; and a non-Gaussian distribution of outputs.

[95] In European history, one might cite the Treaty of Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) after the religious wars, the agreements reached at the Congress of Vienna (1815) after the Napoleonic Wars, the Treaty of Versailles (1919) after World War I, and the creation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions after World War II.

[96] Two decisions of the United States Supreme Court in June 2022 are perhaps illustrative within a national society: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___ (2022) – https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/20-843/ – restricting the permissible regulation of gun ownership; and Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___ (2022) – https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/19-1392/ – reversing Roe v. Wade on a woman's constitutional right to secure an abortion. The large-scale abstention of significant emerging market and developing countries in the UNGA votes on Russia's invasion of Ukraine on March 2, March 24 and April 7 – see footnote 66 – is instructive at an international level.

[97] An example would be Kim Jong-Un – https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kim-Jong-Eun, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[98] These represent – as they did, for example, during the Crusades and the European religious wars, in Sunni-Shi'a clashes in the Levant, and in conflicts between Hindus and Muslims in the Indian subcontinent – extreme versions of the medieval Scholastic distinction between "subjective" truths and the "objective" truth that is accessible only to God (see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae – https://www.logicmuseum.com/truth/aquinasq16.htm). Karl Popper offers an important tangential insight in his assertion that the distinguishing feature of a scientific proposition is that it is capable of being proven to be false as "…the possibility of refuting theories by observations is the basis of all empirical tests." (Popper, Karl. Conjectures and Refutations. Oxford: Routledge, 2002. Popper, Karl. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Oxford: Routledge, 2002).

Appreciable social consensus permitting collective action on specific issues, is likely to emerge for the present only when societies are confronted with deep-seated crises, as with the spate of school shootings in the United States, which enabled the Congress to adopt gun-control legislation[99], and the egregious character of Mr. Putin's invasion of Ukraine and the brutal conduct of his forces, which permitted an unusual measure of unity within Europe with the US, and with US allies in Asia-Pacific. Where the indicated responses involve costly trade-offs – as with energy security in Europe after the Russian invasion – achieving substantive consensus will be difficult.

Material privation, especially in conditions of "stagflation,"[100] and rising stress due to the contestation of values at community levels will lead to psychological burnout, individual lethargy and social atomization, inhibiting constructive political activism and predisposing to violent confrontation.

The confluence and rapid evolution of the congruent info-, bio-, nano and neuro- technologies of the *first post-industrial bio-digital revolution* will transcend societal comprehension, mature ethical consideration and political control, predisposing to disproportionate, poorly regulated exploitation by fragmented, but concentrated, elite technocratic groupings.

Increasing stress on the earth system – climate, oceans and biodiversity – will confront humankind with an existential challenge[101] that will aggravate these tensions but might accelerate the emergence of a new inflection point enabling realignment through collective action.

En route to that point, our resilience to the risks inherent in the workings of a complex, dynamical human system embedded in the biosphere will be undermined by our incapacity to respond coherently, collectively and, in time, to these systemic challenges.

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[99] Statement by President Biden on the Senate Passage of Bipartisan Gun Legislation, The White House, June 23, 2022 – https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/23/statement-by-president-biden-on-the-senate-passage-of-bipartisan-gun-legislation/, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[100] Mutikani, Lucia, Jonathan Cable and Leika Kihara. US recession fears darken outlook for global growth. Reuters, June 23, 2022 – https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/global-economy-us-recession-fears-darken-outlook-japan-global-factories-2022-06-23/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=reuters-business&utm_term=Business%20News%20-%202021%20-%20Master%20List, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[101] In the 21st century, significant advances have been made, but most research is still focused on a single "sphere" – the atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere and biosphere. All are connected, with strong interdependencies and feedbacks. We therefore need a holistic perspective based on a cohesive, integrated entity. Earth system science integrates all relevant disciplines – meteorology, oceanography, geology, biology, ecology and geography, as well as economics and sociology. Earth system models (ESMs) aim to represent the global carbon cycle, dynamic vegetation, atmospheric chemistry, ocean biogeochemistry, sea ice and continental ice sheets, as well as human impacts, to help gauge effects of policies, decisions and actions. A prominent example emerging at present is the EU's Destinations Earth – https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/destination-earth, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

IV   Policy Recommendations

The global order of the second half of the 20th century was built on a normative and legal structure premised on Western values, represented by those seeking to enforce them, as being universal. They were, however, the products of the Western cultural and intellectual tradition, originating in Judeo-Christian ethics and Greco-Roman philosophy and law, informed by the progressive acceptance of rights from Magna Carta through the Western Enlightenment, and reinforced by economic principles born of the Industrial Revolution, and the superior firepower of Western armies and navies in and after the 19th century.

No power, not even the "West," can today independently found a world order on its values and norms. In November 2008, the US National Intelligence Council, in *Global Trends 2025*,[102] recognized this both as a reality and as a trend towards 2025:

> "The whole international system – as constructed following WWII – will be revolutionized. Not only will new players – Brazil, Russia, India and China – have a seat at the international high table, they will bring new stakes and rules of the game."

This was clear then, and is more so today: The re-ascendence of particularly the Asian powers, notably China and India, with deep reservoirs of historical experience, literate high cultures and philosophical reflection, makes challenges to the norms of international exchange established over almost two centuries of Western dominance inevitable. The normative grip of the "West" on the world has slipped, and the characteristics of a successor regime are unclear.[103]

The conduct of international relations involves each nation state pursuing its national *interests* – in accordance with its *values* – in an environment in which the interests and the values of other states often diverge from its own. This tension can only be mitigated by joint definition of a *legitimate order* that accommodates the interests of all powers.

Hedley Bull[104] observed that a global society must comprise "…a *group of states*, *conscious of …common interests and common values…conceiv[ing] themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations to one another*." The challenge is thus to clarify the interests and the values that states have in common, and to negotiate and define the *common set of rules* that will shape inter-state behavior, and our collective conduct in the context of the *global commons*.

State interests will, of course, continue to differ. It is this divergence that makes it challenging to conclude international settlements. To reach agreement, and achieve the larger purpose of an international treaty, states must accept obligations they might prefer not to assume, and make concessions that have costs for their societies, at least in the short term.

Only well-defined norms – or *rules of the game* – recognized by all as transcendent, and justifying the sacrifice of immediate self-, or national, interests, can manage the tension between short-term

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[102]   National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, US Government Printing Office, ISBN 978-0-16-081834-9, Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov.

[103]   Cleary, Seán. Reconceptualising transnational governance: making global institutions fit for purpose, in: Economics, No. 2017-21 (July 20, 2017; originally published in Global Solutions Paper: G20 Issues Brief) – http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2017-21/, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[104]   Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (1997).

national interests and the demands of a global order. Only by explicitly defining an inclusive normative framework appropriate to our time, can we create an anchor for a system of global governance that can address the needs of a highly connected world, and avert a *tragedy of the commons.*[105]

1. Present Opportunities

Amidst the many pressing needs of the present, ending the Ukraine crisis has an especial salience. Despite the violations of both the UN Charter and *ius cogens* by Mr. Putin's forces in Ukraine, and the need to ensure that he secures no reward for these crimes, it is clear that, as with all violent conflicts, negotiations will be required to end the bloodshed and destruction and to craft a peace. As Henry Kissinger remarked trenchantly in 2014, "Russia would not be able to impose a military solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are already precarious. For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one."[106]

No one familiar with the disjunctive exchanges between Russian and US Ministers, and occasionally Heads of State, between the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997[107] is unaware of the shifting currents, misunderstandings and missed opportunities that characterized that time.[108] Javier Solana, who negotiated the Founding Act with Yevgeny Primakov, wrote in Project Syndicate in January 2022:

> "… the fall of the Soviet Union shook Europe to its core. The last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, was aware of the changes that Russia would confront in the coming decades. 'We live in a new world,' he declared in the speech that officially dissolved the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991. Between 1989 and 1991, the Kremlin lost control over an expanse of territory larger than the European Union.
>
> "In the 'new world' that Gorbachev referred to, one part of this lost territory has occupied a singular position in Russian leaders' hearts and minds: Ukraine. Yevgeny Primakov – who was Russia's foreign minister when I, as NATO Secretary General, negotiated the agreement that enabled the Alliance's first expansion after the Cold War's end – often repeated to me, 'Ukraine is in my heart.'"[109]

Mr. Solana remarked, a month before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, that in light of the changes to the world and to Europe since 1997, the European Union would have to engage in crafting "a diplomatic solution to the crisis," and that "…to uphold [the EU's] commitment to peace, the *European security architecture* will have to reflect this new reality."

This is not the place to discuss the details of a new security architecture, but it is not too soon to note that it will need to define an order premised on an equilibrium that meets the vital needs of all states – NATO members, Russia and its neighbors – and is accepted as legitimate by all. To that

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[105] Hardin, Garrett. The Tragedy of the Commons, in: Science Vol. 162, No. 3859.

[106] Kissinger, Henry. To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end, in: Washington Post, March 5, 2014 – https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[107] Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France, May 27, 1997 – https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[108] Baker, James A. The Politics of Diplomacy (with Thomas M. DeFrank) (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995). ISBN 9780399140877.

[109] Solana, Javier. Ukraine and the Fundamentals of European Security. Project Syndicate, January 21, 2022 – https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-ukraine-crisis-requires-european-diplomatic-role-by-javier-solana-2022-01?barrier=accesspaylog, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

end, it is necessary to revisit the draft treaties proposed by the Russian Federation with the US and NATO, published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 17, 2021[110]; and the US and NATO responses to these proposals delivered to the Kremlin by the US[111] and by NATO[112] on January 26, 2022.

The EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, furthermore, observed on March 4, 2022, that "…[t]here is no alternative...Chinese diplomacy has a role to play….We have not asked for it and neither have they, but since…neither the U.S. nor Europe can be (mediators), China could be...."

Building on a series of proposals made in public, and in exchanges with Western leaders between March 7 and April 1,[113] President Xi Jinping formally proposed a *Global Security Initiative*[114] at the *Boao Forum for Asia* on April 22. Clarifying the purpose, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said:

"…President Xi Jinping proposed the *Global Security Initiative*...[expressing a] commitment to

- "…common, comprehensive…and sustainable security, and…world peace...

- "…the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries,…non-interference in internal affairs, and…independent choices of development…and social systems…by people in different countries.

- "…abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, reject[ion] of the Cold War mentality…unilateralism…group politics and bloc confrontation.

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[110] See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, December 17, 2021 – https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en; and Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, December 17, 2021 – https://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/20211217_Draft_Russia_NATO_security_guarantees.pdf. See also Press release on Russian draft documents on legal security guarantees from the United States and NATO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, December 17, 2021 – https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1790809/?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=45553, [retrieved Dec. 18, 2021].

[111] US Responds to Russia's Security Demands, Renewing Call for Diplomacy, VoA, January 26, 2022 – https://www.voanews.com/a/us-responds-to-russia-s-security-demands-renewing-call-for-diplomacy-/6413910.html, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[112] See Press conference, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 26, 2022 – https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_191254.htm?selectedLocale=en, [retrieved Jan. 28, 2022].

[113] On March 7, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on all parties to the conflict to settle disputes by peaceful means and to "…respect and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries." He said that the legitimate security concerns of all parties should be protected, and that "…long-term peace and stability …[requires] a…balanced, effective, and sustainable European security architecture." Beijing offered to play a constructive role to facilitate dialogue and "…to work alongside the international community to carry out necessary mediation." On March 8, President Xi discussed the conflict in these terms with Chancellor Scholz and President Macron. He took a similar position in his call with President Biden on March 19; and in a virtual meeting with European Council President Michel and Commission President von der Leyen on April 1, stressing that the EU and PRC should collaborate for world peace, defend the international system with the UN at its core, international order underpinned by international law, basic norms governing relations on the… principles of the UN Charter; and…oppose attempts at a new Cold War, … to maintain…world peace and stability."

[114] Wei, Xu. Xi proposes Global Security Initiative, in: China Daily, April 22, 2022 – http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202204/22/WS6261ebf5a310fd2b29e58852.html, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

- "…taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously, uphold[ing] …indivisible security, build[ing] a balanced, effective, and sustainable security architecture, and oppos[ing] the pursuit of one's…security at the cost of others' security.

- "…peacefully resolving…disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation, support[ing]…the peaceful settlement of crises, reject[ing] double standards, and oppos [ing]…unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction.

- "…maintaining…traditional and non-traditional…security, and [collaborating]…on regional disputes…terrorism, climate change, cybersecurity, and biosecurity.

- "[It]…focuses on…the security of mankind…to realize world peace…guid[e]…. reform [of] the global security governance system…and advanc[e]…a shared future for mankind. The…Initiative upholds true multilateralism. It is open to the world…. We are ready to work through the UN and…[other] channels to…exchange…views …[to]…contribute…to…[resolution] of…international and regional…[threats] and …[advance] world peace…."[115]

The principles of the *Global Security Initiative* are of broad application and were clearly crafted to align with internationally acceptable principles. Resolution of the conflict in Ukraine through dialogue and consultation, respecting sovereignty, and territorial integrity in line with the UN Charter, and advancing a settlement based on common, comprehensive and sustainable security, would contribute greatly to strengthening a rules-based international order. These principles can be crafted in language that would be acceptable to all. Demonstrating that it is possible for Washington, Brussels (as well as EU member states), London and Beijing to work together through the United Nations, reinforced with bilateral and plurilateral initiatives, to end the brutal killings, displacement and destruction in Ukraine, and to establish a regional security architecture that would minimize the risk of future conflicts, would contribute significantly to enabling constructive collective action in other critical areas.

2.   Structural Impediments

The regular use of their rights of veto by Permanent Members of the Security Council (the P5) has frustrated the achievement of the *Purposes* of the United Nations as set out in the Charter, notably that defined in art. 1(1): "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."

The UN General Assembly's adoption on April 26 of the resolution advanced by Liechtenstein requiring the P5 to justify their use of the veto is a welcome step.[116] Liechtenstein's Permanent Representative said it was motivated by a concern that the Security Council found it increasingly difficult to give effect to its mandate, and that "…the increase in the use of the veto is but the most

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[115] Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's Regular Press Conference on April 21, 2022 – http://is.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202204/t20220421_10671466.htm, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[116] UN General Assembly mandates meeting in wake of any Security Council veto. UN News, April 26, 2022 – https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1116982#:~:text=The%20resolution%2076%2F262%2C%20cospon-sored%20by%2083%20Member%20States%2C,calling%20for%20it%E2%80%99s%20unconditional%20withdrawal%20from%20the%20country, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

obvious expression" of this. He noted that Member States had given the Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and that the veto came with the responsibility to work to achieve "…the purposes and principles of the UN Charter at all times."

> "We are, therefore, of the view that the membership as a whole should be given a voice when the Security Council is unable to act, in accordance with this Assembly's functions and powers reflected in the Charter, particularly Article 10…," he said.

Art. 10 records that the UNGA may discuss any matters within the scope of the Charter, or the powers and functions of any organ, and, except as provided in Art. 12, "…may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council, or to both, on any such questions or matters."

The resolution was co-sponsored by 83 countries and adopted by consensus. It is, however, non-binding, and does not compel any P5 member to explain a veto. In a prepared speech after the resolution was adopted, Gennady Kuzmin, a deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation said Russia had "…no desire to join the consensus. …we are convinced that it is not the veto that should be criticized, but the unwillingness of some members of the Council to hear and take into account the opinions of others, to find compromise and balanced solutions, which often leads to the forced need to apply the veto."[117]

The absence of compulsion and the divergence of the interests of P5 state actors thus make it unlikely that the UNGA consensus resolution will resolve the core problem.

3. A Path Forward

A former UN Deputy Secretary-General, Mark Malloch-Brown, has offered an interesting metaphor for the challenge, describing the configuration of the permanent members of the UN Security Council as constituting a clash "…between values and universality." He notes that, while many global threats require collective action by all parties irrespective of their political differences, Russia's invasion of Ukraine "…abused the UN's core value: the sovereignty of nations."[118] Ukraine can thus question the legitimacy of the UN, because the United Nations retains, as a P5 member state, a government that has betrayed that core value. Likewise, as the P5 no longer represent the distribution of global power in 2022, he asks if the configuration of power in 1945 should determine who has a veto power today.[119]

No state enjoying a disproportionate privilege will abandon it willingly, especially in fraught times when its interests are not secure and it believes that robust action may be needed to secure them. This is at the heart of the considerations of Washington and London when they were unable to secure a mandate from the UN Security Council to invade Iraq in 2003, as well as those invoked by Washington to block Security Council action against Israel over decades, or those advanced by

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[117] See UN General Assembly mandates meeting in wake of any Security Council veto. UN News, April 26, 2022 – https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1116982, [retrieved April 27, 2022].

[118] This aligns with the argument of Liechtenstein's Permanent Representative to the UN, that the right to exercise a veto came with the responsibility to work to achieve "…the purposes and principles of the UN Charter at all times."

[119] Lord Malloch-Brown and Dr. Leslie Vinjamuri, Core contradictions threaten a multilateral future: In the first of a series of interviews with the Queen Elizabeth II Academy Faculty, Lord Malloch-Brown tackles the challenge of agreeing multilateral solutions as international institutions struggle to deal with multiple crises. Chatham House, June 10, 2022 – https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/core-contradictions-threaten-multilateral-future, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

Moscow, sometimes with Beijing's support, to block Security Council resolutions on Syria after 2011.

The logic underpinning the right to a veto in the UN Security Council derives squarely from the circumstances pertaining in 1945. The idealistic principles set out in the preamble – "*to save suc-ceeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better stand-ards of life in larger freedom*" – had to be balanced against the reality of an emergent confrontation between the "West" and the USSR, which would soon find expression in the creation of NATO, CENTO, SEATO and ANZUS ranged against the Warsaw Pact, and the PRC in the Korean War.

P5 vetoes were a means to an end, an effort to secure a commitment to collective action on im-portant matters defined in the Preamble and Purposes of the Charter, while protecting the vital interests of state powers which had the ability to frustrate that noble endeavor. A similar effort is required today to create an order perceived as legitimate by all major powers, as it protects their vital interests by crafting a new, more inclusive, equilibrium.

This requires a new effort, not the maintenance of one crafted in a different context, in a different era, with different needs. The balance between inspiration and protection must, moreover, be finely crafted so as to encourage constructive action on compelling needs to deliver global public goods, and to discourage introverted nationalism and xenophobia.

The UN Secretary-General's initiative – UN@75 – before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic was an effort to achieve this, and had the potential to achieve a universal response.[120] The pandemic interrupted the endeavor, but led to the delivery of a report to the General Assembly pursuant to A/RES/75/1, with "…recommendations to advance our common agenda and to respond to current and future challenges in a spirit of solidarity and effective multilateralism." The report, *Our Common Agenda*, was delivered to the Assembly[121], and a High-level Advisory Board on Effective Multilat-eralism[122] was constituted to assist the Secretary-General in the preparation of his final report to the General Assembly.

Drawing on the insights of his Advisory Board, the UN Secretary-General must make specific pro-posals to the UN General Assembly about both the substantive character of a rules-based international order that will enjoy legitimacy among all member states, and the structural and sys-temic reforms to the UN system that are needed to bring that order into existence and to sustain it effectively in the decades ahead. All should engage to require, and to contribute to, that outcome.

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[120] Cleary, Sean. A Rules-based international Order in the Present Era. Conference: Multilateralism and Sustain-able Development. Imperial Springs International Forum 2019, Imperial Springs, Guangzhou, PRC, December 2019 – https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337783522_A_Rules-based_international_Or-der_in_the_Present_Era, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[121] Summary of Secretary-General's report on Our Common Agenda – https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/summary.shtml, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

[122] Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism Comprises 12 Eminent Current or Former Global Leaders, Officials, Experts. UN News, March 18, 2022 – https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sga2108.doc.htm, [retrieved June 30, 2022].

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